ECON136
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Market Design
Course Description
Use of incentive and algorithm theory to design practical mechanisms for matching markets with or without money payments. Matching algorithms without money have applications including school choice, organ exchanges, charitable food distribution, and some entry-level labor markets, while auction mechanisms using money have applications including natural resources, financial assets, radio spectrum, and advertising. Guests will speak about practical applications. Students must write term paper.
Grading Basis
ROP - Letter or Credit/No Credit
Min
5
Max
5
Course Repeatable for Degree Credit?
No
Course Component
Discussion
Enrollment Optional?
Yes
Course Component
Lecture
Enrollment Optional?
No
This course has been approved for the following WAYS
Formal Reasoning (FR)
Does this course satisfy the University Language Requirement?
No
Courses
ECON136
is a
prerequisite
for:
Programs
ECON136
is a
completion requirement
for: